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Abstract
In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by
offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive
device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only
accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have
to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the
vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allo-
cation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications
of a ban on exclusivity clauses.
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1 Introduction
If a firm accepts a contract with an exclusivity clause, it may not deal with
competitors of the firm that issued the contract. The debate on such ex-
clusivity agreements divides policy makers and scholars into two fractions.
Critics argue that exclusivity clauses are anticompetitive because they fore-
close entry.1 Advocates invoke efficiency motives, claiming that exclusivity
protects value-generating investments from free-riding.2
In this paper, we compare arguments for and against exclusivity clauses.
To do so, it is crucial to specify which type of exclusivity we are looking
at. According to Segal and Whinston (2000a), “a contract between a buyer
and a seller is said to be exclusive if it prohibits one party to the contract
from dealing with other agents.” In our model, the character of exclusivity
depends on which side of the market offers contracts. Most of the existing
literature deals with what is usually called “exclusive dealing”: Suppliers
write contracts with exclusivity clauses, which prohibit retailers to purchase
from other suppliers. In addition to this, we also discuss what we refer to
as “exclusive provision”: Retailers offer contracts with exclusivity clauses,
which stipulate that contracting suppliers are not allowed to additionally sell
to other retailers.
A prominent example for exclusive provision is the distribution of Ap-
ple’s iPhone via selected service providers.3 For instance, in the United
States, the iPhone was sold exclusively through AT&T between 2007 and
1Proponents of the foreclosure argument include Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen,
Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991), and Segal and Whinston (2000b). Upon Fumagalli and
Motta’s (2006) critique that the former authors’ findings rely on buyers being final cus-
tomers, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Wright (2009) extend the argument to a
setting more similar to ours, including buyers competing in a downstream market.
2Proponents of the incentives argument include Williamson (1979) and Marvel (1982).
Segal and Whinston (2000a) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) specify that the
efficiency-enhancing property of exclusivity clauses only holds in cases where investment
has external effects on third parties.
3The arrangements between Apple and the service providers are usually referred to as
“tying” agreements. In the present paper, however, we ignore the complementary between
the primary good and potential services provided by retailers. In fact, we consider retailers
as pure reselling entities.
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2011.4 That is, every customer who wanted to buy an iPhone had to ac-
cept AT&T’s monopoly price. Obviously, this generates a correspondingly
high willingness-to-pay for exclusivity on behalf of AT&T. As financial data
suggests, it was indeed Apple who ended up reaping the bulk of the benefits
from this exclusivity arrangement.5
In the following, we show that this straightforward mechanism carries
over to more competitive settings. This is remarkable, as even with several
retailers reselling a homogeneous product obtained from multiple suppliers,
the resulting allocation might be the same as in the monopoly case.6
Imagine a setting with two suppliers and two retailers. Exclusivity clauses
require that the suppliers sell their product to only one retailer.7 In return,
a retailer could offer more favorable quantities and wholesale prices. Alter-
natively, the retailer could offer less favorable terms, but allow the suppliers
to contract with its competitor as well. If both retailers choose this second
option, they effectively eliminate competition between them in the upstream
market: as long as the suppliers’ production cost is covered, both offers are
accepted. In this case, the retailers purchase Cournot quantities and both
make positive profits. However, if a retailer found a way to also eliminate
competition in the downstream market, its margin would be even higher. By
means of the exclusivity clause, it is equipped with an instrument which facil-
itates this purpose. An arbitrarily small compensation is sufficient to induce
both suppliers to accept such a clause. Hence, both of them provide the
same retailer, which in turn obtains a monopoly position in the downstream
market.
Of course, one retailer obtaining the monopoly profit and the other get-
ting nothing cannot be an equilibrium. Facing exclusivity clauses, suppliers
4Similar agreements were established in numerous other countries, such as Germany
(T-Mobile), UK (O2), Japan (SoftBank Mobile), and Spain (Movistar).
5See, for instance, Kuittinen (2012). Another example for exclusive-provision contracts
is the wide-spread use of exclusive broadcasting rights for major sport events. For an
overview of competition issues in this context, see OECD (2013).
6For the sake of brevity, we do not show the equivalence between the monopolistic and
the competitive setting here. The results are available on request.
7Accordingly, we consider exclusive provision as defined above. We formally discuss this
case in Section 3. The conclusions drawn here are only partially applicable to exclusive
dealing, as we show in Section 4.
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have to select a single retailer. Hence they only head for the most favorable
deal. This in turn induces tough competition between the retailers. In fact,
they are forced to extract as much consumer surplus as possible and redi-
rect it to the suppliers. Thus exclusivity clauses strengthen competition, but
competition for the suppliers instead of competition for the customers.
Our efficiency argument is quite in contrast with a variety of papers that
support the traditional Chicago School argument that exclusivity clauses
mainly arise to economize on transaction costs.8 In Marvel (1982), exclu-
sive dealing allows suppliers to prevent retailers from opportunistic behav-
ior. Once the retailers refrain from buying no-frills substitutes, suppliers are
willing to invest into value-generating pre-sale information. Thus exclusive
dealing provides a supplier with a property right on promotional expenses.
In a similar vein, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that a (monopolistic)
supplier is confronted with its own incentive to renegotiate terms with com-
peting retailers. Doing so impairs the rewards for incumbent retailers and
decreases their ex-ante willingness to pay. Exclusivity clauses are an easily
observable and verifiable approach to curb such opportunism. As in Marvel
(1982), they increase the joint profit by inducing a higher level of invest-
ment. Accordingly, demand might increase as well. This, in turn, leaves the
potential for positive welfare implications.
In contrast, welfare is clearly negatively affected if exclusivity clauses
are strategically deployed to deter entry which otherwise would have taken
place. In Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston
(2000b), suppliers need to reach a certain scale to produce at minimum aver-
age cost. By locking in sufficiently many buyers, an incumbent supplier can
thus prevent entry of competitors, and buyers agree to sign contracts includ-
ing exclusivity clauses. In an earlier article, Aghion and Bolton (1987) show
that entry prevention is also possible without a positive minimum efficient
scale if the incumbent can draw on more sophisticated contracts including
“liquidated damages” clauses. Such contingent transfers to the incumbent
8Classical examples are Bork (1978) and Williamson (1979).
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supplier serve as an entry fee for outside suppliers, and enable the incumbent
supplier–retailer pair to extract monopoly rents.9
Our model builds upon a similar idea, although we drop the asymmetry
between incumbents and entrants and thus investigate a more competitive
framework. Consequently, contracting parties use exclusivity clauses not for
strategic purposes but because they are forced to use them to withstand com-
petition. This turns out to be self-destructive. Whenever a contract-issuing
firm employs an exclusivity clause, it has to promise the most favorable prices
and quantities to its counterparties. Thus it ends up with zero profit. Alto-
gether, we obtain the same quantities and prices as in a setting with a single
vertically integrated firm.10
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
Next we discuss how the outcome depends on the sequence of play. In Section
3 we study the case of exclusive provision. We distinguish between two
scenarios: fist we study homogeneous suppliers; then we consider a situation
in which their costs of production differ. In the latter instance, screening
becomes possible, along with an outcome where only the efficient supplier
prevails. In Section 4 we contrast exclusive provision with exclusive dealing,
the standard setting in the literature. Exclusivity clauses now force suppliers
to maximize the retailers’ individual profits. This induces Cournot rather
than monopoly quantities, resulting in a lower customer price. While a ban
on exclusive provision may increase welfare, prohibiting exclusive dealing
has adverse effects: Absent exclusivity clauses, suppliers set their wholesale
prices above marginal cost. In turn they have to reduce their quantities,
as otherwise the retailers buy from one supplier only. This increases the
customer price in the downstream market. In Section 5, we take account
of the conflicting implications of exclusive provision and exclusive dealing.
9In line with the existing theory, the empirical literature on exclusivity clauses is incon-
clusive. Evidence on customer price effects is scarce and mainly centered around the beer
brewing industry. For an overview, see Lafontaine and Slade (2008). Furthermore, au-
thors such as Slade (2000) and Asker (2004) find that exclusivity constraints lead to higher
markups of the vertical supply chain and increased customer prices. These observations
are consistent with both lines of reasoning.
10To be precise, this conclusion is restricted to the exclusive-provision framework. With
exclusive dealing, the maximization of individual retailers’ surpluses entails Cournot quan-
tities and prices.
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Which type of contract arises endogenously? We conjecture that retailers
could confront exclusive-dealing contracts with more profitable counteroffers.
Exclusive-provision contracts are less vulnerable, thus we expect the retailers
to make offers in equilibrium. In Section 6, we conclude by discussing our
results in light of their policy implications. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 Model
We consider the following vertical relation. Suppliers produce a good, which
they sell to retailers. These, in turn, resell it to final customers. Demand
is given by p(Q) = a − bQ, where p is the output price and Q is the total
quantity sold in the downstream market. Demand is positive for a positive
range of p, and the law of demand applies; that is, a > 0 and b > 0.
In the upstream market there are two groups of strategic players: two sup-
pliers and two retailers.11 Each supplier s ∈ {H,L} maximizes the expected
value of
πs =
∑
r∈{1,2}
(wsr − cs)qsr, (1)
where qsr is the quantity of the output that supplier s sells to retailer r ∈
{1, 2}, and wsr is the (per-unit) wholesale price. cs is the marginal cost
of production of supplier s.12 We assume supplier H to be (weakly) less
efficient than supplier L. Specifically, cH = c + ∆, and cL = c − ∆ with
∆ ≥ 0. Suppliers cannot sell their output directly to customers. Instead,
supplier s sells it at a wholesale price wsr to retailer r.
The retailers buy the input in the upstream market and sell it to final
customers. Each retailer r ∈ {1, 2} maximizes the expected value of
πr =
∑
s∈{H,L}
(p(Q)− wsr)qsr, (2)
11Most of the results which follow are readily applicable to settings with more firms,
because Bertrand-related mechanisms lead to perfect competition already with two firms.
12From p(Q) = a − bQ, we see that cs ≥ a implies that there are no gains from trade.
Therefore, without any loss of generality, we impose that cs < a for s ∈ {1, 2}.
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with Q = ∑s∈{H,L}∑r∈{1,2} qsr. r resells the product to final customers. For
simplicity, we assume that this can be done without incurring any additional
(reselling) cost.
The determination of wsr and qsr crucially depends on the sequence of
moves. In Section 3, we consider the case where the retailers fix wholesale
prices and quantities which they are willing to buy. In Section 4, the suppliers
announce terms of sale. We specify the contracts below, along with the ex-
clusivity clauses which the firms may impose. For now, a general description
of the contracting game suffices: In a first stage, either the retailers (Section
3) or the suppliers (Section 4) make binding take-it-or-leave-it offers. In the
second stage, the recipients of the contracts may accept one, both, or none
of these offers. Their choice might be restricted, as they potentially have to
abide by exclusivity clauses.13
We focus on symmetric, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies, according to the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Symmetry). Identical players choose identical strategies. As
the suppliers differ in their production efficiency, Assumption 1 only applies
to the retailers.
Assumption 2 (Pure Strategies). We analyze Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies. If a retailer faces two identical offers from suppliers H and L, the
offer from (the more efficient) supplier L is chosen. If a supplier faces two
identical offers from (identical) retailers, each of these offers is selected with
probability 0.5.
Assumption 3 (Subgame Perfection). The contract-submitting parties do not
make offers which generate negative payoffs if accepted. Accordingly, we rule
out equilibria in weakly dominated strategies.
13From the nature of exclusivity clauses, it follows that such clauses are imposed by the
firms which offer quantities and wholesale prices. To see this, suppose to the contrary that
a firm makes an offer which restricts it (instead of its trading partners) not to deal with
other parties. Such a contract fails to specify what happens once more than one trading
party accepts.
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3 Exclusive Provision
In this section, we consider the case where the retailers r ∈ {1, 2} make
binding offers, and the suppliers s ∈ {H,L} select among these. Offers from
the retailers are of the type Φr := (qr, wr, er), where qr = qsr for s = {H,L},
and wr = wsr for s = {H,L}. Furthermore, er is a binary choice variable,
which indicates whether retailer r stipulates an exclusivity clause. If er = 1,
each supplier which sells to r is not allowed to sell the product to the other
retailer. If er = 0 for r = {1, 2}, the suppliers are allowed to accept both
offers.14
In Figure 1, we illustrate exclusive provision. In the upper-left diagram,
we depict a situation without exclusivity clauses. Thus both suppliers, s1
and s2, can provide both retailers, r1 and r2. In the upper-right diagram,
a supplier selling its product to r2 is not allowed to additionally provide r1.
Meanwhile, there is no contractual restriction which prevents r1’s suppliers
to also provide r2. Nevertheless, s1 cannot serve both retailers either. If s1
approaches r2, it forgoes the possibility to provide r1. We depict this in the
lower-left panel. In fact, the suppliers’ options are equally restricted, regard-
less of whether one or both retailers impose exclusivity clauses. Accordingly,
in both instances we obtain the same set of possible outcomes (compare the
upper-right panel with the lower-right panel).
In order to derive equilibria Φ∗r (and eliminate putative equilibria Φ̂r),
we study properties of qr, wr, and er which necessarily hold whenever no
retailer has a unilateral incentive to offer an alternative bundle Φ̃r.15 At the
end of this section, we show that equilibria Φ∗r necessarily feature exclusivity
clauses. For the moment, to facilitate the analysis, we simply assume that
e∗r = 1 for r = {1, 2}.
14Note that, say, e1 = 1 and e2 = 0 implies that the suppliers cannot deal with both
retailers. Thus a retailer can single-handedly install overall exclusivity, and no retailer can
unilaterally remove an overall exclusivity regime if er = 1 for r = {1, 2}.
15In this section, we interchangeably use Φ∗r to denote equilibria and equilibrium con-
tracts (analogous with putative equilibria Φ̂r). Implicitly, equilibria further require that
each supplier accepts the most profitable contract. (Regarding ties, see Assumption 2.)
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r1
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e1 = 0, e2 = 0
s1
s2
r1
r2

e1 = 0, e2 = 1
s1
s2
r1
r2


e1 = 0, e2 = 1
s1
s2
r1
r2

e1 = 1, e2 = 1
Figure 1: Exclusive Provision
From (2), we can write the expected profit of retailer r as16
E[πr] =
∑
x∈{1,2}
P [r has x suppliers](p(Q)− wr)xqr. (3)
From (1), it further follows that supplier s’s profit upon accepting r’s offer is
πs(r) = (wr − cs)qr. (4)
Provided that both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied (πs(r)
is non-negative for either r), we infer from (4) that supplier s ∈ {H,L}
approaches retailer r whenever qr(wr − cs) > q−r(w−r − cs). If qr(wr − cs) =
q−r(w−r − cs), each supplier is indifferent between the two retailers, and
Assumption 2 implies that the suppliers accept the offer of each retailer with
probability 1/2. In this case, r obtains 2qr with probability 1/4, qr with
probability 1/2, and 0 with probability 1/4. Accordingly, (3) equals
πr =

(a− 2bqr − wr)2qr if (wr − cs)qr > (w−r − cs)q−r,(
a− b2(3qr + q−r)− wr
)
qr if (wr − cs)qr = (w−r − cs)q−r,
0 if (wr − cs)qr < (w−r − cs)q−r.
(5)
16For ease of notation, we omit the expectation operator in the following.
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By means of the following lemmas, we show that for cH = cL the retailers
strongly compete for the two suppliers. For sufficiently high levels of ∆, they
only compete for the efficient supplier L, and the less efficient supplier H is
driven out of the market.
Note that Lemmas 1 trough 4 throughout make reference to equilibria
where the retailers make offers. Furthermore, we consistently suppress the
implicit assumption that e∗r = 1 for r ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 1. Both retailers obtain zero profit. Thus, if both suppliers’ partic-
ipation constraints are satisfied, we have
w∗r = a− b2q∗r . (6)
If only the efficient supplier’s participation constraint is satisfied, we have
w∗r = a− bq∗r . (7)
Lemma 1 implies zero profits on behalf of the retailers, which is a nec-
essary condition for each individual retailer to not having an incentive to
outbid its opponent’s offer (and thereby double its own customer base).
Lemma 2. If both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied, the profit
of either supplier H or supplier L is maximized subject to (6). If only the effi-
cient supplier L’s participation constraint is satisfied, L’s profit is maximized
subject to equation (7).
For some intuition for Lemma 2, consider Figure 2, where wr = a− 2bqr
depicts the zero-profit line of the retailers for the case where both suppliers
accept an offer. From equation (4), we can state supplier s’s marginal rate
of substitution between qr and wr at (q̂r, ŵr) as17
MRSs(q̂r, ŵr) := −
ŵr − cs
q̂r
> −2b,
17As can be seen in Figure 2 (and will be of importance later on), the absolute value
of MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) exceeds the absolute value of MRSH(q̂r, ŵr). This is because the lower
marginal cost of supplier L leads to higher markups for L than for H (ŵr−cL > ŵr−cH).
Accordingly, to sustain the profit at a constant level, a reduction in qr requires a higher
compensation for L than for H.
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qr
wr
wr = a− 2bqr
πL(q̂r, ŵr)
πH(q̂r, ŵr)
(q̃r, w̃r) (q̂r, ŵr)
Figure 2: If no suppliers’ profit is maximized conditional on wr = a − 2bqr,
a deviating retailer can attract both suppliers and obtain a positive profit.
In the example of Figure 2, in contrast to Lemma 2, neither supplier L’s
nor supplier H’s profit is maximized conditional on the retailers’ zero-profit
condition. Specifically, we have MRSs(q̂r, ŵr) > −2b for s ∈ {H,L}. Due
to the intersection of the suppliers’ isoprofit curves with the retailers’ zero-
profit line, a deviating retailer r could instead offer (q̃r, w̃r) within the shaded
region in Figure 2. Since for both suppliers such an offer would lead to higher
profits than (q̂r, ŵr), the deviating retailer r would attract both H and L.
Hence, r’s zero-profit line would be unaffected, which implies that (q̃r, w̃r)
would lead to positive profits. In this case, as well as in all other cases where
not at least either H’s or L’s profit is maximized conditional on the retailers’
zero-profit condition, (q̂r, ŵr) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
It directly follows from Lemma 2 that in the case of homogenous suppliers,
both retailers offer (half of) the monopoly quantity.
Corollary 1. For ∆ = 0, we have q∗r = (a− c)/4b and w∗r = (a+ c)/2.
Simple as it is, Corollary 1 conveys a central result of this paper: The
retailers’ exclusivity clauses imply that only the best offer has a chance of
being accepted. Hence competition is vigorous. Not only do the retailers offer
wholesale prices which equal the price they charge their final customers. In
addition, total quantities aggregate to the amount a monopolistic vertically
integrated firm would sell. Once all retailers offer their share of the monopoly
quantity, the final price is independent of the suppliers’ allocation. Thus if
11
qr
wr
wr = a− 2bqr πL(q̂r, ŵr)
πH(q̂r, ŵr)
(q̃r, w̃r)
(q̂r, ŵr)
Figure 3: If supplier H’s profit is maximized conditional on wr = a− 2bqr, a
deviating retailer can attract supplier L and obtain a positive profit.
an individual retailer lowers its quantity, it would be disregarded by the
suppliers. By offering more, it would make losses.
In a similar way as in Lemma 2, next we rule out equilibria where the
profit of supplier H is maximized.
Lemma 3. For ∆ > 0, an outcome where the profit of supplier H is maxi-
mized subject to (6) cannot be an equilibrium.
In a putative equilibrium Φ̂r where the profit of the less efficient supplier
H is maximized (conditional on wr = a − 2bqr), the (absolute value of the)
marginal rate of substitution of supplier L exceeds the slope of the zero-profit
line of the retailers (see Figure 3). Due to the intersection of L’s isoprofit
curve with the retailers’ zero-profit line, a deviating retailer r could instead
offer Φ̃r, which lies in the region of positive profits for the retailers, even
with the original zero-profit line. Furthermore, by offering Φ̃r, supplier r’s
zero-profit line becomes wr = a−bq̂r−bqr. That is, it rotates around (q̂r, ŵr),
as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 3. If retailer r offered any contract
within the shaded area in Figure 3, the inefficient supplier H would strictly
prefer the opponent retailer −r (which offers Φ̂), and the efficient supplier L
would strictly prefer r. Hence, by exclusively attracting supplier L, r could
increase its profit, which eliminates Φ̂r.
From Lemmas 1 through 3, it follows that in any symmetric equilibrium,
the profit of supplier L must be maximized subject to (6) or (7), that is,
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to a zero-profit condition of the retailers. As we show next, whenever this
implies that both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied, there are
profitable deviations possible (unless if ∆ = 0, see Corollary 1), and there
is no equilibrium. However, if cL and cH are sufficiently far apart from each
other, there exists a unique equilibrium where only the efficient supplier L is
attracted by the retailers.
Lemma 4. For ∆ > 0, there exists no equilibrium where both suppliers’
participation constraints are satisfied. If ∆ > (a− c)/3, there exists a unique
equilibrium in which H’s participation constraint is violated.
To see this, first consider a candidate equilibrium where both suppliers
participate. From Lemmas 2 and 3, we know that MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) = −2b in
such an equilibrium. Since MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) < MRSH(q̂r, ŵr), it is generally
possible to increase qr and decrease wr in a way that the new contract Φ̃r is
only attractive for supplier L. As a consequence, the zero-profit line rotates
around (q̂r, ŵr) (see Figure 3) such that Φ̃r, which leads to negative profits
according to the original zero-profit line, becomes profitable.18
Deviations of this type, however, are not feasible if an equilibrium con-
tract Φ∗r violates supplier H’s participation constraint. In this case, it follows
from Lemmas 1 and 2 that any profitable deviation involves attracting the
inefficient supplier H. Since the region of profitable contracts with two sup-
pliers, wr < a−b2qr, is a subset of the region of profitable contracts with one
supplier, wr < a−bqr, there is no profitable deviation which involves attract-
ing both suppliers. Hence, the only possible deviation would be attracting
supplier H without attracting supplier L. However, since L would stay with
the other retailer, any quantity provided by supplier H would further dete-
riorate the customer price p. As can be seen in Figure 4, it follows from the
retailers’ zero-profit condition (w∗r = p∗) and H’s non-participation condition
(w∗r < cH) that p∗ < cH . Hence, no contract Φ̃r with q̃r > 0 and w̃r ≥ cH
would lead to positive profits of the retailer, indicated by the shaded area in
Figure 4. Therefore, whenever maximizing supplier L’s profit conditional on
the retailers’ zero-profit condition (7) leads to a wholesale price below cH ,
18Instead of attracting each supplier with probability 1/2, the deviating retailer attracts
supplier L for sure.
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qr
wr
wr = a− bqr
cH
wr = a− bq∗r − bqr
(q∗r , w∗r)
πL(q∗r , w∗r)
p∗ = a− bq∗r
Figure 4: If supplier L’s profit is maximized conditional on wr = a− bqr, and
cH is sufficiently high, no contract for which wH ≥ cH is profitable.
there exists an equilibrium where the less efficient supplier H does not accept
any offer. This is the case if and only if
w∗r =
a+ cL
2 < cH ⇔ ∆ >
a− c
3 .
What Happens if Exclusivity Clauses are Banned? Suppose now
that exclusivity clauses are illegal. In this case, supplier s ∈ {H,L} ac-
cepts any offer with wr ≥ cs. Accordingly, each retailer sets wNEr = cL.
Furthermore, from quantity competition in the downstream market, both
retailers purchase the Cournot quantity qNEr = (a − cL)/3b, and obatain
πNEr = (a− cL)2/9b.
Will Exclusivity Clauses Be Used? When exclusivity clauses are al-
lowed, will they actually be used?
From the previous paragraph, we know that in a candidate equilibrium
without exclusivity clauses, both suppliers obtain zero profit, that is, πNEs = 0
for s ∈ {H,L}.
If ∆ > 0, by offering Φ̃r with w̃r = cL + ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small,
even in combination with an exclusivity clause, r could attract L without
attracting H. As a monopolist in the downstream market, r could set q̃r =
(a− w̃r)/2b. Since π̃r = (a− w̃r)2/4b exceeds πNEr for ε < (a− c+ ∆)/3, this
eliminates the candidate equilibrium without exclusivity clauses.
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If ∆ = 0, r would attract both suppliers by offering w̃r = c+ε, and could
therefore set q̃r = (a− c)/4b. For ε < (a− c)/3, this constitutes a profitable
deviation.
Regarding equilibria with exclusivity clauses, a unilateral deviation from
e∗r = 1 to ẽr = 0 is effectless. As the other retailer maintains e∗−r = 1, the
suppliers still have to choose between the two retailers. Hence, the above
results, together with e∗r = 1 constitute an equilibrium indeed.
Proposition 1 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 1. Consider the case where retailers can engage in exclusive
provision. For ∆ = 0, there is a unique equilibrium, where each retailer
offers Φ∗r with q∗r = (a − c)/4b, w∗r = (a + c)/2, and e∗r = 1. Both suppliers
choose each retailer with probability 1/2. The corresponding output price is
p∗ = (a + c)/2. Both retailers make zero profit. The profit of each supplier
s ∈ {H,L} is π∗s = (a−c)2/8b. For 0 < ∆ < (a−c)/3, there is no equilibrium.
For ∆ ≥ (a − c)/3, there is a unique equilibrium, where each retailer offers
Φ∗r with q∗r = (a − c + ∆)/4b, w∗r = (a + c − ∆)/2, and e∗r = 1. Supplier L
chooses each retailer with probability 1/2. Supplier H does not accept any
offer. The output price is p∗ = (a+ c−∆)/2. Both retailers and supplier H
make zero profit. Supplier L obtains π∗L = (a− c+ ∆)2/4b.
4 Exclusive Dealing
Now we look at the opposite setting where the suppliers s ∈ {H,L} make
binding offers, and the retailers select among these. Offers from the suppliers
are of the type Φs := (qs, ws, es), where qs = qsr for r = {1, 2}, and ws =
wsr for r = {1, 2}.19 Analogous to the case above, es indicates whether s
stipulates an exclusivity clause. If es = 1, each retailer which purchases qs
at ws from s is not allowed to purchase the product from the other supplier.
If es = 0 for s = {H,L}, the retailers are allowed to purchase from both
suppliers.
19By analogy with our previous notation (see footnote 15), we use (Φ∗H ,Φ∗L) to de-
note both equilibria and equilibrium contracts. The same applies to putative equilibria
(Φ̂H , Φ̂L).
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r1
r2

e1 = 0, e2 = 1
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Figure 5: Exclusive Dealing
In Figure 5, we illustrate exclusive dealing. When either none or both
suppliers impose exclusivity clauses, the firms’ possibilities to cooperate are
equally restricted as with exclusive provision. Thus we refrain from repli-
cating the respective diagrams from Figure 1. If only one supplier requires
exclusivity, the choice of the retailers is restricted. Each of them can only
purchase from one supplier. In the left panel, we depict a situation where re-
tailer r2, which purchases from supplier s2, is contractually restricted to not
purchase from supplier s1. Retailer r1 is not restricted by its own supplier,
s1. However, r1’s choice is equally limited, since s2 refuses to deal with r1 as
long as r1 maintains its relation with s1. Otherwise put, in order to purchase
from s2, r1 has to forego its relation with s1 (see the right panel).
In any equilibrium (Φ∗s,Φ∗−s) where both retailers accept the offer of sup-
plier s, accepting this offer must be a weakly dominant strategy. To avoid
repetitions, we occasionally refer to Result 1, which states that dominance
can be broken down to a single condition.
Result 1. Choosing supplier s is a (weakly) dominant strategy (over choosing
supplier −s) if and only if
(a− 2bqs − ws)qs > (≥) (a− bqs − bq−s − w−s)q−s. (8)
Accordingly, whenever s caters both retailers, each retailer would also
accept s’s offer if the other retailer would not. Therefore, in the subgames
where the retailers choose their suppliers, every equilibrium where s prevails
is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
As in the previous section, we derive (Φ∗H ,Φ∗L) by means of a number of
lemmas. In Lemmas 5 through 8, we suppress that we refer to equilibria
where the suppliers make offers. At the end of this section, we show that in
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most circumstances equilibria necessarily feature exclusivity clauses, and in
the remaining cases where equilibria without exclusivity clauses exist, this is
because there is a de-facto monopoly on behalf of the more efficient supplier
L. For the moment, we simply assume that e∗s = 1 for s ∈ {H,L}.
Lemma 5. The less efficient supplier H is not chosen by any retailer.
The intuition for Lemma 5 is simple: If supplier H’s contract was to be
accepted, it must be strictly better than L’s offer. Thus L could undercut
H by mimicking H and marginally lower the offered wholesale price. This is
possible unless ŵH = cH and cH = cL. Nevertheless, also this remaining case
cannot be an equilibrium. Since H’s offer would be strictly better that L’s
offer, H could marginally decrease its offered wholesale price. Its offer would
still be strictly better, and H could obtain a positive profit. This eliminates
all putative equilibria of this type.
Lemma 6. Supplier H sets w∗H ≥ cH , supplier L sets w∗L ≤ cH .
The first statement of Lemma 6 directly follows from Assumption 3: Each
putative equilibrium where supplierH sets its wholesale price below marginal
cost violates subgame perfection. The second statement stems from the fact
that H could obtain a positive profit by slightly undercutting L’s offer when-
ever ŵL > cH . This is in contradiction with Lemma 5.
Lemma 7. If ∆ ≥ 3(a − c)/5, there exists a continuum of equilibria with
q∗L = (a − cL)/4b and w∗L = (a + cL)/2. If 0 ≤ ∆ < 3(a − c)/5, every
equilibrium features w∗L = w∗H = cH .
From Result 1 we know that a necessary condition for supplier H to
profitably enter is to attract one retailer, given the other retailer sticks with
L. Although the retailers make zero profit at L, to offer a mutually profitable
contract Φ̃H , the inefficient supplier H must ensure that the resulting total
quantity q̃H + q∗L is low enough to cause the customer price taking on a value
above w̃H . Since the low marginal cost cL of supplier L further implies a
high (monopoly) quantity q∗L, there is no low enough q̃H > 0 which attracts
a retailer, given w̃H > cH .20
20If H offered a sufficiently small q̃H in combination with cH < w̃H < a, both retailers
(and thus the deviating supplierH) would profit by mutually acceptingH’s offer. However,
the retailers suffer from a “prisoners’ dilemma”.
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If ∆ is small, supplier L cannot maintain its monopoly contract. In this
case, if we had ŵL < ŵH , and the retailers strictly preferred L’s offer, L
could do better by slightly increasing wL such that choosing L would still be
a dominant strategy for the retailers. Similarly, if the retailers are indifferent
between the two suppliers’ offers (and accept L’s offer, see Assumption 2), we
show in Appendix A.9 that L’s best reaction to any of H’s offers ΦH involves
w∗L ≥ wH . Together with Lemma 6, this implies w∗H = w∗L = cH .
Lemma 8. If 0 ≤ ∆ < 3(a − c)/5, in any equilibrium each supplier s ∈
{H,L} offers Φ∗s with q∗s = (a−c−s)/3b. Together with Lemma 7, this implies
that there is no equilibrium whenever 0 < ∆ < 3(a − c)/5. If ∆ = 0, there
exists a unique equilibrium.
Lemma 8 states that, if ∆ = 0, both suppliers offer the Cournot duopoly
quantity at a wholesale price equal to the suppliers’ marginal cost. Accord-
ingly, both retailers are provided with the quantity which they would have
chosen themselves. If, say, supplier −s would offer a different quantity, the
contract of supplier s which includes the Cournot quantity would be strictly
better. This would give s an incentive to increase its wholesale price ws.
If ∆ > 0, Lemma 8 requires that each supplier offers the Cournot quan-
tity with marginal costs of the other supplier. If this could be done by
simultaneously offering a wholesale price which equals the other supplier’s
marginal cost, there would not be a way to profitably deviate. This, how-
ever, is not possible for the inefficient supplier H which would incur losses by
doing so. That is, L is more competitive, and it follows from standard results
of Cournot theory that L’s quantity lies above H’s quantity. In this case,
L wants to decrease its wholesale price, which is in contrast to the result of
Lemma 7. Accordingly, there is no equilibrium for 0 < ∆ < 3(a− c)/5.
Before we summarize the results of Lemmas 5 through 8 in Proposition
2, we discuss the possibility of equilibria without exclusivity clauses.
What Happens if Exclusivity Clauses are Banned? As in the pre-
vious section, we compare the above equilibria with results which emerge
under a ban on exclusivity clauses.
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In a “no-exclusivity” equilibrium ΦNEs with es = 0 for s = {H,L}, first
suppose that both suppliers offer positive quantities which are accepted by
the retailers. If this is true, retailer r has no incentive to deviate by not
purchasing from supplier s. That is,
(a− 2bqs − 2bq−s − ws)qs
+ (a− 2bqs − 2bq−s − w−s)q−s
≥ (a− bqs − 2bq−s − w−s)q−s. (9)
Furthermore, (9) has to hold as an equality, as otherwise supplier s could
increase its wholesale price ws without deterring any retailer. Upon sim-
plification, this implies ws = a − b(2qs + 3q−s), and in an equilibrium each
supplier s ∈ {H,L} solves
(qNEs , wNEs ) = arg maxqs,ws (ws − cs)2qs
s.t. ws = a− b(2qs + 3q−s), (10)
which yields the reaction function of supplier s,
qNEs (qNE−s ) =
a− cs
4b −
3
4q
NE
−s . (11)
Together with the constraint in (10), equation (11) implies
qNEs = (a+ 3c−s − 4cs)/7b, (12)
wNEs = (2a+ 6c−s − cs)/7, (13)
and
πNEs = (2a+ 6c−s − 8cs)2/49b.
If ∆ > (a − c)/7, we have qNEH = 0, and L acts as a monopolist in
the upstream market. Therefore, L sells qNEL = (a − c + ∆)/4b at wNEL =
(a + c − ∆)/2. In this case, H cannot make an offer which the retailers
accept in addition to L’s offer. H can, however, attempt to make an offer
which the retailers choose instead of L’s offer. Since each retailer r obtains
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πNEr = 0 at L, H could attract r and obtain a positive profit by offering Φ̃H
with w̃H = cH + ε, ε > 0, and (a− bqNEL − bq̃H − w̃H)q̃H > 0. As it is possible
to find such an offer whenever 0 < ∆ < 3(a − c)/5, there is no equilibrium
within this range.
If ∆ ≥ 3(a − c)/5, the inefficient supplier H has no means to challenge
L’s monopoly behavior. Accordingly, the outcome under a ban on exclusivity
clauses mirrors the outcome when exclusivity clauses are allowed (see Lemma
7). In fact, due to the absence of H’s competitiveness, the market structure
is the same as with only one supplier. Of course, under such circumstances
it is irrelevant to distinguish between varying exclusivity regimes.
Will Exclusivity Clauses Be Used? First consider the case where, un-
der a ban of exclusivity clauses, both suppliers sell positive quantities; that is,
∆ ≤ (a− c)/7. In this case, once exclusivity clauses are allowed, (ΦNEH ,ΦNEL )
with eNEs = 0 for s = {H,L} no longer constitutes an equilibrium. More pre-
cisely, supplier H could profitably deviate by offering an alternative contract
Φ̃H with q̃H = 2(a − c)/7b, w̃H = (2a + 5c)/7 − ε, and ẽH = 1. That is, in
addition to imposing an exclusivity clause, H could offer the total quantity
of both suppliers, given in (12), at a wholesale price which is slightly below
the average wholesale price, given in (13). To see this, first note from Result
1, it is a dominant strategy for retailer r to choose H’s offer whenever
(a− 2bq̃H − w̃H)q̃H > (a− bq̃H − bqNEL − wNEL )qNEL
⇔ ε[(a− c)/7] > −∆2.
which holds for all ∆ ≥ 0 and ε > 0. Consequently, H’s deviation profit
would exceedH’s equilibrium profit in the case of a ban on exclusivity clauses
whenever
(w̃H − cH)2q̃H > πNEH = 4(a− c− 7∆)/49b
⇔ ε[28(a− c)2] < (a− c)2 − 49∆2 + 7(a− c)∆. (14)
Since for ∆ < (a − c)/7 it holds that 49∆2 < (a − c)2, the right-hand side
of (14) is positive for all ∆ ∈ [0, (a − c)/7]. Hence, there exists ε > 0 such
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that both retailers would prefer H’s alternative contract Φ̃H , and H would
increase its profit.
Next, consider the case where only L sells a positive quantity in the
absence of exclusivity clauses. As we have shown in the previous paragraph,
in this case it is not possible for supplier H to persuade a retailer to choose
H instead of L, neither with nor without exclusivity clauses. Furthermore,
L obtains its unconstrained profit maximum. Therefore, if ∆ ≥ 3(a − c)/5,
equilibria require no restrictions on exclusivity clauses of either supplier.
Finally, regarding equilibria with exclusivity clauses, unilateral deviations
from e∗s = 1 to ẽs = 0 are effectless, and the offers Φ∗s of Lemma 8, together
with e∗s = 1 for s = {H,L} constitute an equilibrium indeed. However, there
are two additional equilibria where only one supplier imposes an exclusivity
clause. If ∆ = 0, and the opponent supplier sets e∗−s = 0, supplier s which sets
e∗s = 1 could remove bilateral exclusivity by individually switching to ẽs = 0.
Nevertheless, in this case, inequality (9), together with q∗−s = (a − c)/3b,
requires w̃s ≤ c− 2bq̃s, which prevents s from obtaining a positive profit.
We summarize the results of this section in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Consider the case where suppliers can engage in exclusive
dealing. For ∆ = 0, each supplier s ∈ {H,L} offers Φ∗s with q∗s = (a− c)/3b,
w∗s = c, and e∗r ∈ {0, 1}. At least one supplier sets e∗r = 1. Both retailers
accept the offer of supplier L. The output price is p∗ = (a + 2c)/3. Both
suppliers make zero profit. The profit of each retailer is π∗r = (a − c)2/9b.
For 0 < ∆ < 3(a − c)/5, there is no equilibrium. For ∆ ≥ 3(a − c)/5,
there is a continuum of equilibria where supplier L offers Φ∗L = ΦNEL with
q∗L = (a− c+∆)/4b, w∗L = (a+ c−∆)/2, and e∗L ∈ {0, 1}. Supplier H’s offer
is such that both retailers accept Φ∗L. Both retailers and supplier H make
zero profit. The profit of supplier L is π∗L = (a− c+ ∆)2/4b.
5 Discussion
In order to discuss welfare properties of both unconstrained outcomes and
equilibria in the case of a ban on exclusivity clauses, it is convenient to com-
pare the customer prices arising from final demand. Since the retailers’ and
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suppliers’ participation constraints ensure that no inefficiently high quantity
is provided, equilibrium customer prices can be used to compare utilitarian
welfare levels.
In Table 1, we provide an overview of the customer prices as they depend
on the suppliers’ difference in efficiency, on the policy towards exclusivity
clauses, and on whether the retailers or the suppliers offer contracts.
∆ ∈ 0
(
0, a−c7
] (
a−c
7 ,
a−c
3
) [
a−c
3 ,
3(a−c)
5
) [
3(a−c)
5 , a− c
)
Exclusive Provision
Exclusivity
allowed
a+c
2 — —
a+c−∆
2
a+c−∆
2
Exclusivity
banned
a+2c
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
Exclusive Dealing
Exclusivity
allowed
a+2c
3 — — —
a+c−∆
2
Exclusivity
banned
3a+4c
7
3a+4c
7 — —
a+c−∆
2
Table 1: Values of the customer price for various regimes and values of ∆.
If the retailers make offers, customer prices are higher once exclusivity
clauses are allowed. This holds because, without exclusivity clauses, the
retailers do not have to compete for suppliers, as the latter accept any of-
fer which covers their production cost. Accordingly, the retailers’ appetite
for higher quantities is only restrained by the negatively-sloped downstream
demand curve. This leads them to engage in Cournot competition, which im-
plies p∗ = (a+2(c−∆))/3. In contrast, in the presence of exclusive provision,
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suppliers only accept the most favorable contract, which induces the retailers
to strongly compete. As a result, the retailers are obliged to promise up to
the maximum they can reap in the downstream market. Consequently, they
have to offer the monopoly surplus, which they obtain from the customers
thereupon. Even if the retailers only compete for the efficient supplier L, the
resulting customer price, p∗ = (a+ c−∆)/2, still exceeds the customer price
without exclusivity clauses, pNE = (a+ 2(c−∆))/3.
This result is reversed once we examine the opposite setting where the
suppliers make offers. In this case, customer prices are lower with exclusiv-
ity clauses than without. Similarly as described above, exclusivity clauses
force the suppliers to intensely compete for the retailers. Thus they have
to offer the best possible contract from an individual retailer’s perspective;
that is, they sell Cournot quantities at wholesale prices which equal their
marginal cost of production. A ban on exclusivity clauses, in principle, alle-
viates competition, as in this case suppliers do not have to outperform their
competitors in order to be taken into consideration. However, when faced
with large quantities, retailers may profit from denying a contract, as this in-
creases the customer price they obtain in the downstream market. Therefore,
from equation (9), each supplier s is constrained by
ws = a− b(2qs + 3q−s). (15)
By solely considering (15) (and supposing that ws = cs), we would find that a
ban on exclusive dealing increases the altogether provided quantity. However,
if wholesale prices were set at marginal cost, the suppliers would obtain zero
profit. This can be avoided by increasing ws, conditional on ensuring that
(15) still holds. Thus qs has to be reduced, which leads to a higher customer
price than in the case with exclusivity clauses.21
When allowed, irrespective of which side of the market makes offers, ex-
clusivity clauses are used (as long as there is no de-facto monopoly of a
substantially more efficient supplier L). Taking this into account, Table 1
shows that offers of the retailers lead to higher customer prices than offers
21If ∆ ≥ 3(a−c)/5, there is no difference between contracts with and without exclusivity
clauses. As discussed in Section 4, such a setting corresponds to a quasi-monopoly of the
more efficient supplier, where exclusivity regimes do not matter anymore.
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of the suppliers. In both instances the firms necessarily maximize the profit
of the other side of the market. If the suppliers propose contracts, however,
maximizing an individual retailer’s surplus implies offering a higher quantity,
since part of the negative customer-price effect is passed on to the competing
retailer. Such externalities are absent if the retailers make offers.22 There-
fore, retailers are better capable of maximizing the joint surplus of the vertical
supply chain, which leads to higher customer prices.
Which Side of the Market Makes Offers? The question which conse-
quently arises is whether we rather expect exclusive provision (Section 3) or
exclusive dealing (Section 4) to prevail. Instead of building up a theoreti-
cal superstructure, we refer to the Coase’s (1960) theorem, which essentially
postulates that voluntary contracts between firms necessarily maximize these
firms’ joint benefit. Accordingly, contracts will be specified in such a way that
there is no alternative contract with a higher joint surplus. As profit increases
can be split between the contracting parties, profit-maximizing contracts will
be agreed upon. Therefore, by reasoning along the lines of the previous sec-
tions, exclusive dealing cannot be sustained once we allow for counteroffers on
behalf of the retailers. The latter are more capable to extract the customers’
willingness to pay. Therefore, in principle, equilibria where the suppliers
make offers (as in Section 4) can be eliminated. Retailers find a counteroffers
which lead to a Pareto-superior allocations. Whether the above discussed
instruments (quantites, wholesale prices, exclusivity clauses) are sufficient to
reach the equilibrium of Section 3, or whether side-payments are required,
clearly depends on the structure of the “counteroffer game”. For the present
paper, we leave this issue aside.
22Externalities are also absent in case of exclusive dealing with a monopolistic retailer,
as in Bernheim and Whinston (1998). They find that “the form of representation (i.e.,
exclusivity or common representation) is chosen to maximize the joint surplus of the
[vertical supply chain]”. This result does not apply here, as the suppliers are forced to
use exclusivity clauses, although the thus generated externalities result in a jointly less
profitable allocation.
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6 Conclusion
In contrast to previous work, in our setup exclusivity clauses are neither
used to foreclose, nor do they align incentives. Instead they are necessary
features of competitive contracts. Nevertheless, their welfare effect may be
detrimental, because competitive forces are not directed towards the well-
being of customers. Rather, to stay in business, contract-issuing firms have
to maximize the profit of their counterparts in the upstream market.
Of course, our results hinge on the specification of the framework. In
particular, firms are able to commit on an array of variables such as prices,
quantities, and exclusivity clauses. Hence possible extensions of the model
would allow firms to offer “menu contracts” or include bargaining on the
terms of trade.
Regarding policy implications, our analysis suggests that prohibiting ex-
clusivity clauses potentially improves welfare. An overall ban, however, seems
to be premature. Despite our conjecture that “exclusive provision” arises en-
dogenously, in practice we often observe “exclusive dealing”. For this case,
we have shown that a prohibition of exclusivity clauses might reduce effi-
ciency. Moreover, firms could be induced to substitute exclusivity clauses by
other vertical restraints such as retail price maintenance, quantity discounts,
exclusive territories, tying and the like.
Against this ambiguous background, it seems consistent that both the
United States23 and the European Union24 treat exclusive contracts under a
rule-of-reason approach, in which economic efficiencies are balanced against
anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, as exemplified, policy makers should
not be mislead by the competition-promoting effect of exclusivity clauses:
In fact, it is precisely this effect which may force contract-issuing firms to
exploit their final customers.
23See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
24See European Commission (2010).
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the case where both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied. Then, with
w∗r = a− b2q∗r , it follows from equation (5) that both retailers obtain zero profit.
To the contrary, suppose there is an equilibrium Φ̂r with ŵr > a− b2q̂r. In this case,
both retailers make losses. By offering Φ̃r with q̃r(w̃r − cs) < q̂r(ŵr − cs) for s ∈ {H,L},
a deviating retailer r would not be chosen by any supplier, which improves r’s profit to 0.
Suppose next that ŵr < a− b2q̂r. In this case,
π̂r = (a− 2bq̂r − ŵr)q̂r > 0. (A.1)
Due to the continuity of (A.1), for all ε > 0 there exist an alternative contract Φ̃r with
q̃r > q̂r and w̃r > ŵr such that
(a− 2bq̃r − w̃r)q̃r > π̂r − ε.
But if q̃r > q̂r and w̃r > ŵr, we have q̃r(w̃r−cs) > q̂r(ŵr−cs) and both suppliers approach
the deviating firm r. In this case, r’s profit is
π̃r = (a− 2bq̃r − w̃r)2q̃r > 2(π̂r − ε). (A.2)
By comparing (A.1) with (A.2), we observe that π̃r > π̂r for all ε < π̂r/2.
The proof where only the efficient supplier L’s participation constraint is satisfied is
analogous.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To the contrary, suppose that in a symmetric equilibrium Φ̂r the retailers obtain zero
profits, but neither supplier’s profits are maximized subject to the retailers’ zero-profit
condition. In this case, if both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied, we have
MRSs(q̂r, ŵr) := −
ŵr − cs
q̂
6= −2b,
for s ∈ {H,L}, and, if only the efficient supplier L’s participation constraint is satisfied,
we have
MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) = −
ŵr − cH
q̂
6= −b.
If no participation constraint is satisfied, trivially, a deviating retailer could offer a suffi-
ciently attractive contract, which would increase its profit from zero to a positive value.
Next consider putative symmetric equilibria Φ̂r where both suppliers’ participation
constraints are satisfied. Since, for all (q̂r, ŵr), MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) < MRSH(q̂r, ŵr), we can
distinguish between the following three (exhaustive) cases for which MRSs(q̂r, ŵr) 6= −2b
for s ∈ {H,L}. For each case, by deriving profitable deviation strategies, we show that it
cannot constitute an equilibrium.
Case 1 : MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) ≤ MRSH(q̂r, ŵr) < −2b.
First note that in such a case, both suppliers’ participation constraints are strictly satis-
28
fied. This is because, from ŵr ≤ cH follows MRSH(q̂r, ŵr) ≥ 0, which is a contradiction
to MRSH(q̂r, ŵr) < −2b.
Because both suppliers’ participation constraints are strictly satisfied, a deviating
retailer r could attract both suppliers by marginally increasing qr and adjusting (lowering)
wr(qr) in a manner that
dwr
dqr
> MRSH(q̂r, ŵr). (A.3)
In this case, r’s profit function would be
πr = (a− 2bqr − wr(qr))2qr, (A.4)
which equals π̂r = 0 at (qr, wr) = (q̂r, ŵr). The first-order effect on πr from increasing qr
would be [
dπr
dqr
]
(qr,wr)=(q̂r,ŵr)
=
(
−2b− dwrdqr
)
2q̂r. (A.5)
Since, by assumption, there exists ε > 0 such that MRSH(q̂r, ŵr) < −2b − ε, r could
choose dwr/dqr = −2b− ε, which satisfies (A.3) and renders (A.5) positive.
Case 2 : −2b < MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) ≤ MRSH(q̂r, ŵr).
Then, a deviating retailer r could attract both suppliers by marginally decreasing qr and
adjusting (increasing) wr(qr) in a manner that
dwr
d(−qr)
> −MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) ⇔
dwr
dqr
< MRSL(q̂r, ŵr). (A.6)
In this case, r’s profit function would be (A.4), and the first-order effect on πr from
decreasing qr would be[
dπr
d(−qr)
]
(qr,wr)=(q̂r,ŵr)
=
(
2b+ dwrdqr
)
2q̂r. (A.7)
Since, by assumption, there exists ε > 0 such that MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) > −2b+ε, r could choose
dwr/dqr = −2b+ ε, which satisfies (A.6) and renders (A.7) positive.
Case 3 : MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) < −2b < MRSH(q̂r, ŵr).
In this case, we necessarily have ∆ > 0, and supplier L’s participation constraint is strictly
satisfied. Therefore, a deviating retailer r could attract supplier L without attracting sup-
plier H by marginally increasing qr and adjusting (lowering) wr(qr) in a manner that
MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) <
dwr
dqr
< MRSH(q̂r, ŵr). (A.8)
In this case, r’s profit function would be
πr = (a− bq̂r − bqr − wr(qr))qr, (A.9)
and the first-order effect on πr from increasing qr would be[
dπr
dqr
]
(qr,wr)=(q̂r,ŵr)
=
(
−b− dwrdqr
)
q̂r. (A.10)
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By assumption, dwr/dqr = −2b satisfies (A.8) and renders (A.10) positive.
Finally, we consider putative equilibria where only the efficient supplier L’s participation
constraint is satisfied, that is, ŵr < cH . In this case, whenever MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) 6= −b, there
exists a combination (q̃r, w̃r) below the zero-profit line ŵr = a − bq̂r, which is preferred
by L as compared to (q̂r, ŵr). Since ŵr < cH , the less-efficient supplier H would not
be attracted by marginal changes in (qr, wr), which leaves the zero-profit line unaffected.
Thus, r can profitably deviate in a similar manner as described above.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
If ∆ = 0, Lemma 2 requires (w∗r , q∗r ) to maximize qr(wr−c) conditional on (6). Accordingly,
we have
(q∗r , w∗r) = arg max
qr,wr
(wr − c)qr s.t. wr = a− b2qr = ((a− c)/4b, (a+ c)/2).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose there exists an equilibrium Φ̂r with MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) < −2b = MRSH(q̂r, ŵr). A
deviating retailer r could attract supplier L without attracting supplier H by marginally
increasing qr and adjusting (lowering) wr(qr) in a manner that
MRSH(q̂r, ŵr) >
dwr
dqr
> MRSL(q̂r, ŵr). (A.11)
In this case, r’s profit function would be given by (A.9), and the first-order effect on πr
from increasing qr would be given by (A.10). Since, by assumption, there exists ε > 0
such that MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) + ε < −2b, r could choose dwr/dqr = −2b − ε, which satisfies
(A.11) and renders (A.10) positive.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
First suppose that both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied in a symmetric
equilibrium Φ̂. From Lemmas 1 through 3 we know that in such an equilibrium
(q∗r , w∗r) = arg max
qr,wr
(wr − cL)qr s.t. wr = a− b2qr = ((a− cL)/4b, (a+ cL)/2),
π̂r = 0, π̂L = (a− cL)2/8b, and π̂H = (a− cL)/4b× (a+ cL−2cH)/2. By increasing qr and
adjusting (lowering) wr such that the utility of supplier L is marginally increased, retailer
r’s offer would only be attractive for L, and H would stay with the competing retailer −r,
which offers (q̂r, ŵr). In this case, r’s profit function would be
πr = (a− bq̂r − bqr − wr(qr))qr,
where wr(qr) is such that a marginal deviation of (qr, wr(qr)) from (q̂r, ŵr) only attracts
supplier L. The first-order effect on πr from increasing qr then would be[
dπr
dqr
]
(qr,wr)=(q̂r,ŵr)
=
(
−b− dwrdqr
)
q̂r. (A.12)
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Since MRSH(q̂r, ŵr) > MRSL(q̂r, ŵr) = −2b, by choosing dwr/dqr = −2b + ε, with ε
sufficiently small, retailer r would attract supplier L, whereas supplier H would stay with
retailer −r, which offers (q̂r, ŵr). As a result, (A.12) would be positive, which eliminates
the putative equilibrium.
Next, consider the case whereH’s participation constraint is violated in an equilibrium
Φ∗r . From Lemma 2, we know that in this case L’s profit must be maximized conditional
on the retailers’ zero-profit condition (7). Therefore, from a similar computation as in
Corollary 1, Φ∗r involves q∗r = (a − c + ∆)/2b, w∗r = (a + c − ∆)/2, π∗r = 0, π∗L =
(a − c + ∆)2/4b, and π∗H = 0. As L’s profit is maximized conditional on (7), every
potentially profitable deviation Φ̃r from Φ∗r involves attracting H.
It follows from r’s profit function (5) that any deviation Φ̃r which attracts both suppli-
ers is only profitable if w̃r < a−2bq̃r. Since in the proposed equilibrium π∗L = q∗r (w∗r − cL)
is maximized conditional on w∗r ≤ a− bq∗r , no profitable Φ̃r which attracts both suppliers
exists.
On the other hand, if a deviation consists of attracting H without attracting L, the
profit of the deviating retailer equals
π̃r = (a− bq∗r − bq̃r − w̃r)q̃r.
As H’s participation constraint (w∗r ≥ cH) is violated if and only if ∆ > (a − c)/3, it
follows that q∗r > 2(a − c)/3b. Attracting supplier H further requires w̃r ≥ cH , thus we
have
π̃r <
(
a− b
[
2(a− c)
3b
]
− bq̃r − cH
)
q̃r.
By writing cH = c+ ∆, ∆ > (a− c)/3 implies
π̃r < −bq̃2r < 0.
A.6 Proof of Result 1
We prove Result 1 for the case of strict dominance. For weak dominance, the proof is
identical, except that weak inequalities are replaced by strict ones.
In addition to condition (8), strict dominance requires
(a− bqs − bq−s − ws)qs > (a− 2bq−s − w−s)q−s. (A.13)
Since (8) can be rewritten as (a− bqs − bq−s −ws)qs > (a− 2bqs − bq−s −w−s)q−s + bq2s ,
(8) implies (A.13) whenever
(a− 2bqs − bq−s − w−s)q−s + bq2s > (a− 2bq−s − w−s)q−s
⇔ (qs − q−s)2 > 0.
This is true whenever qs 6= q−s. If qs = q−s, inequality (8) requires ws < w−s, which also
implies inequality (A.13).
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Any equilibrium (Φ̂H , Φ̂L) where H is chosen by the retailers requires ŵH ≥ cH , because
H could avert negative profits by offering a sufficiently unattractive contract Φ̃H .
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If ŵH > cH and the retailers choose H, L could attract both retailers by offering Φ̃L
with q̃L = q̂H and w̃L = ŵH − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small. In this case, choosing
L would be a strictly dominant strategy for both retailers, and L’s profit would increase
from 0 to (w̃L − cL)q̃L > (cH − cL)q̂H ≥ 0.
To rule out the case that the retailers chooseH when ŵH = cH , recall that Assumption
2 requires
π̂r = (a− 2bq̂H − ŵH)q̂H > π̂r(L), (A.14)
where π̂r(L) denotes retailer r’s profit which could be obtained by accepting supplier L’s
offer instead. But then, H could also offer Φ̃H with q̃H = q̂H and w̃H = ŵH + ε. For
sufficiently small values of ε > 0, inequality (A.14) would remain valid, and both retailers
would still opt for supplier H. Furthermore, H’s profit would increase, which eliminates
the remaining candidate equilibrium where H is chosen by the retailers.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 6
Assumption 3 rules out equilibria with ŵH < cH , hence w∗H ≥ cH .
Next suppose that ŵL > cH . From Lemma 5, we know that both retailers choose
supplier L, and thus the profit of supplier H is π̂H = 0. By offering Φ̃H with q̃H = q̂L
and w̃H = ŵL − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small, choosing H would be a strictly dominant
strategy for both retailers. In this case, H’s profit would be π̃H = (w̃H − cH)2q̃H =
(ŵL − ε− cH)2q̂L > 0.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 7
As it follows from Lemma 5 that supplier H is not chosen in any equilibrium, we have
(a− 2bq̂L − ŵL)q̂L ≥ max {(a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH)q̂H , 0} . (A.15)
From Result 1, (A.15) implies that it is a strictly dominant strategy for the retailers to
choose supplier L whenever (A.15) holds strictly. Then, however, L could offer Φ̃L with
q̃L = q̂L and w̃L = ŵL+ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small. In this case, inequality (A.15) would
remain valid; that is, choosing L would still be a dominant strategy for both retailers. Fur-
thermore, L’s profit would be higher by offering Φ̃L than by offering Φ̂L, which eliminates
all (candidate) equilibria with (a− 2bq̂L − ŵL)qL > max {(a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH)qH , 0}.
Otherwise, if (A.15) holds with equality, we distinguish between the following cases.
Case 1 : (a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH)q̂H ≤ 0.
In this case, L solves
(q̂L, ŵL) = arg max
qL,wL
(wL − cL)2qL s.t. wL = a− 2bqL,
which yields q̂L = (a − cL)/4b and ŵL = (a + cL)/2. In this case, each retailer r obtains
π̂r = 0 at L.
This, however, cannot be an equilibrium if ∆ < 3(a − c)/5, because then H could
attract r and obtain a positive profit by offering Φ̃H with w̃H = cH + ε and (a − bq̂L −
bq̃H − w̃H)q̃H > 0. Therefore, the suggested equilibrium only exists for ∆ ≥ 3(a− c)/5.
Case 2 : (a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH)q̂H > 0.
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To show that any equilibrium with (a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH)q̂H > 0 requires w∗H = w∗L = cH ,
it follows from Lemma 6 that it is sufficient to show that ŵH > ŵL cannot be part of an
equilibrium in this case.
From L’s objective function and from (A.15), in any such equilibrium, L solves
(q̂L, ŵL) = arg max
qL,wL
(wL − cL)2qL
s.t. wL = a− 2bqL −
qH
qL
(a− bqL − bqH − wH), (A.16)
which yields
q̂L(q̂H) =
a− cL
4b +
q̂H
4 . (A.17)
From the constraint in (A.16), it follows that
ŵL ≥ a− 2bq̂L − max
q̂L,q̂H
{
q̂H
q̂L
(a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:γ1
. (A.18)
Furthermore, from the equality version of (A.15), and from the fact that in any equilibrium
the retailers obtain non-negative profits, we have
γ2 := a− bq̂L − bq̂H − ŵH ≥ 0.
Therefore,
∂γ1
∂q̂L
= − q̂H
q̂2L
γ2 +
q̂H
q̂L
(−b) < 0. (A.19)
Now suppose that q̂H ≤ (a− cL)/3b. In this case, (A.17) implies
q̂H ≤ q̂L ≤ (a− cL)/3b. (A.20)
Therefore, from (A.19), subject to (A.20), γ1 is maximized at q̂L = q̂H . Together with
(A.18), this yields
ŵL ≥ a− 2bq̂L − (a− 2bq̂L − ŵH) = ŵH , (A.21)
which is the required contradiction to ŵH > ŵL for the case that q̂H ≤ (a− cL)/3b.
Next, suppose that q̂H ≥ (a− cL)/3b. In this case, (A.17) implies
q̂H ≥ q̂L ≥ (a− cL)/3b. (A.22)
Therefore, from (A.19), subject to (A.22), γ1 is maximized at q̂L = (a − cL)/3b. From
(A.17), this further requires q̂H = (a− cL)/3b, and thus q̂H = q̂L. Therefore again, (A.18)
implies (A.21), which constitutes the required contradiction to ŵH > ŵL for the second
case that q̂H ≥ (a− cL)/3b.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 8.
First suppose that supplier L instead offers q̂L = (a− cH)/3b+ δ with δ 6= 0. In this case,
H could offer Φ̃H with q̃H = (a − cH)/3b and w̃H = cH + ε. From Result 1, choosing H
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is a dominant strategy for both retailers if and only if
π̃r := (a− 2bq̃H − w̃H)q̃H > π̂r := (a− bq̃H − bq̂L − cH)q̂L
⇔ (bδ)2 > ε(a− c)/3.
Hence, by setting ε > 0 sufficiently small, H would attract both retailers, and H would
obtain a positive profit. This eliminates all equilibria with q̂L 6= (a− cH)/3b.
Next suppose that supplier H offers q̂H = (a − cL)/3b + δ with δ 6= 0. In this case,
we know from the strict inequality versions of (A.20), (A.21), and (A.22) (see the proof
of Lemma 7) that ŵL > ŵH . This, however, contradicts Lemma 7, and eliminates all
equilibria with q̂H 6= (a− cL)/3b.
Using q∗s = (a − c−s)/3b, equation (A.16) in Appendix A.9 implies w∗L ≤ w∗H , where
the inequality is strict if and only if ∆ > 0. But then it follows from Lemma 7 that there
is no equilibrium for ∆ > 0.
If cH = cH = c, to show that Φ∗s with q∗s = (a − c)/3b and w∗s = c constitutes an
equilibrium, first consider potential deviations of supplier L. From the equality versions
of (A.20), (A.21), and (A.22), we know that L’s best answer to Φ∗H indeed is Φ∗L with
q∗L = q∗H and w∗L = w∗H . Regarding supplier H, first note that offering a contract with
w̃H < c can never lead to a positive profit for H. Second, if H cannot attract any retailers
by offering a contract with w̃H = c, this is also not possible with any contract with w̃H > c.
If H offers Φ̃H with w̃H = c and q̃H = (a− c)/3b+ δ with δ 6= 0, both retailers accept the
offer of L, since it follows from Result 1 that
π̂r := (a− 2bq̂L − ŵL)q̂L > π̃r := (a− bq̂L − bq̃H − w̃H)q̃H ⇔ δ2 > 0
implies that accepting L’s offer is a dominant strategy for both retailers.
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